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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, * 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. * 
Case No. 981469-CA 
WILHELIMINA LOTTE, 
* Priority 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction 
in the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County, 
Utah, before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, enterd on the 
2nd day of June, 1998. 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
by virtue of Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 78-2a-2 (2) (f) (1953 as amended). 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. May an officer insert his head inside a vehicle he has 
stopped for a traffic stop without probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion? 
2. Even if an officer may intrude his body into a vehicle 
subsequent to a traffic stop but prior to the establishment 
of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, may a burnt tablespoon 
form the evidence sufficient to permit the officer to further 
detain and request the driver to allow further search of vehicle? 
3. Should an officer be compelled to obtain a search warrant if 
he observes what may be drug paraphenelia in an automobile stopped 
for a traffic violation? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for suppression issues is 
that findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly 
erroneous. State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 215 (Utah App 1991). 
The standard of review for conclusions of law is 
a correction of error standard. State v_. Steward. supra. 
TABLE OF CASES and STATUTES, ORDINANCES and CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE 
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1. State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Ut. Ct App) 
2. State v_. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Ut. Ct App 1993) 
3. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Ut. Ct App 1994) 
4. State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 272 (Utah 1984) 
5
- State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 
6. State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Ut. Ct App 1996) 
7. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.Id 1132 (Utah 1989) 
8. State v^ Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 1991) 
9. State v. Strickling, 884 P.2d 979 (Utah App 1992) 
10. U.S. v_. Angular-Fernandez, 1995 WL 257255 (10th Cir) 
11. U.S. y\ Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487 (10th Cir 1993) 
12. U.S. v. Walker, No. 90-CR-13 (Utah 1990) 
13. United Sates Constitution, Fourth Amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
11. Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not 
be violated and no warrant shall issue but 
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upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirm action, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 27, 1997, the defendants automoble was stopped 
for speeding in Davis County with a visual estimate of speed by 
the Utah Highway Patrol. (TR.4) The officer approached the de-
fendant while she was seated as driver in the vehicle and asked for 
defendant's registration and as the defendant reached for that the 
officer stuck his head into the vehicle and looked in. (Tr 5 at 
lines 18 to 21 and Tr. 14 lines 11 to 16, and Tr 15 at lines 2 to 
6). 
The officer saw a burned spoon in the drivers side door 
compartment and based upon that he asked to search the automobile 
of the defendant (Tr. 15 lines 19 to 20). He obtained her verbal 
consent, conducted a search and found in the purse of defendant 
he found white powder residue that turned out to be controlled 
substance (Tr 7 lines 17 to 23 and Tr 8 lines 1 to 3). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant was charged in the possession of methaphetmine 
a third degree felony and possession of paraphenlia on February 27, 
1997, in Davis County, State of Utah. 
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The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during a 
search of her car and an evidentiary hearing was held on April 15, 
1998, before the Honorable Jon Memmott in Farmington, Utah. The 
Motion to Suppress was denied on the 15th day of April, 1998. On 
June 2, 1998, the defendant entered a conditional plea to 
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony and the 
defendant appealled to this Court on June 23, 1998. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. MAY AN OFFICER INSERT HIS HEAD INSIDE A VEHICLE HE HAS 
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC STOP WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE 
SUSPICION? 
The defendant maintains that in a traffic stop the arresting 
officer may not insert his head into the stopped vehicle without 
reasonable suspicion or other valid reason and that such an in-
sertion is a search. 
2. EVEN IF AN OFFICER MAY INTRUDE HIS BODY INTO A VEHICLE 
SUBSEQUENT TO A TRAFFIC STOP BUT PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION, MAY A BURNT TABLESPOON 
FORM THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE OFFICER TO FURTHER 
DETAIN AND REQUEST THE DRIVER TO ALLOW FURTHER SEARCH OF VEHICLE? 
The defendant maintains that the sight of a burned spoon does 
not rise to the level or reasonable suspicion that a felony has 
been committed. 
3. SHOULD AN OFFICER BE COMPELLED TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT 
IF HE OBSERVES WHAT MAY BE DRUG PARAPHENELIA IN AN AUTOMOBILE 
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION? 
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That there is no finding from the record and nothing in the 
record to find exigent circumstances to allow a search 
and seizure without a warrant nor is there anything to suggest that 
a warrant could not be obtained. 
ARGUMENT 
1. MAY AN OFFICER INSERT HIS HEAD INSIDE A VEHICLE HE HAS 
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC STOP WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE 
SUSPICION? 
In the case at bar the police officer, shortly after the stop 
of the defendant's automobile, "stuck" his head inside the automo-
bile of the defendant's automobile and looked inside. (Tr 15 lines 
2 to 6). He did this without consent or justification. He saw a 
burnt spoon by looking down to the door compartment (Tr 15 line 4) 
and then asked to search the vehicle which was granted by the de-
fendant. The officer testified he asked for consent because of the 
spoon he saw (Tr 15 line 19 to 20). 
The defendant contends that there is no testimony in the 
record which would indicate that a burned spoon is in any manner 
indicative of any unlawful activity or even that the officer con-
cluded that a burnt spoon is indicative of crime activity. Thusly, 
there are no articulable acts to connect the defendant with the 
possession of drugs. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, (Utah Ct App 
6 
1994), and State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App 1991). 
The argument is that the State must establish some testimony 
that a burnt spoon means something and that something rises to 
articulable suspicion. No such testimony is extant at all. 
However, even if there were testimony linking the burnt spoon 
to criminal activity and thusly serve as articulable suspicion, 
there was no right for the officer to have inserted his head into 
the interior of the defendant's automobile. 
There was no objection probable cause to allow the officer to 
invade the automobiles interior and look around. There needs to be 
a common sense assessment the circumstances. State v. Brown, 798 
P.2d 284, 285 (Utah App 1990). There were no facts at all for the 
officer's intrusion and thusly the search must fail even if this 
became a level two stop pursuant to State v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003 
(Ut. App 1996) because such a search requires some reasonable 
suspicion even if there is a temporary detention in order to write 
a speeding ticket. 
2. EVEN IF AN OFFICER MAY INTRUDE HIS BODY INTO A VEHICLE 
SUBSEQUENT TO A TRAFFIC STOP BUT PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION MAY A BURNT TABLESPOON 
FORM THE EVIDENCE SUFFICENT TO PERMIT THE OFFICER TO FURTHER 
DETAIN AND REQUEST THE DRIVER TO ALLOW FURTHER SEARCH OF THE 
VEHICLE? 
The defendant argues that if there is no evidence at all of 
the signficance of a burnt spoon, then the State may never be 
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said to have met the burden of showing articulable suspicion or 
probable cause. 
State v. Steward, 806 P.d 213, 216, (Ut. App 1991) is to the 
effect that mere driving in proximity to drug searches in nearby 
houses is not enough facts to show a suspicion of criminal 
activity. 
In State v_. Patefield. 927 P. 2d 655 (Ct. App 1996) the court 
failed to find probable cause in a level two situation where the 
officer observed a 12-pack of beer because the possession of beer 
is lawful. 
These cases are valid precedent for the idea that even if the 
Court has properly before it the spoon in question because the 
officer's insertion of his head is ruled valid, there must be 
some connection of that to criminal activity. Nothing exists in 
the record or by common sense and the request to search the vehicle 
based upon such a spoon is not permissable because there is no 
articulable suspicion of anything. 
3. SHOULD AN OFFICER BE COMPELLED TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT 
IF HE OBSERVES WHAT MAY BE DRUG PARAPHENELIA IN AN AUTOMOBILE 
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION? 
Assuming arguendo that the officer in the case at bar had the 
right to intrude his head into the vehicle of the defendant while 
he was asking her for her registration and assuming that a spoon 
which has a burn spot on it is indicative of drug paraphenlia 
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giving the officer reasonable suspicion to further detain the de-
fendant, should the officer have obtained a warrant? 
Nothing in the record indicates that there was any problem in 
obtaining a warrant. The level-two stop had escalated into some-
thing more because the officer had seen what he thought was 
something that gave him reasonable suspicion to continue or 
escalate the seizures as in State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 
(Utah 1994) and fftate v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Ut App 1996). 
The officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop to conduct 
a search contrary to State v. Figuero - Solorio 830 P.2d 276, 280 
(Utah App 1992) and State _v. Robison, 797 P.2d 431 (Ut. App 1990) 
but also, the issue would have been resolved had he obtained a 
warrant. 
State y_. Larrocco, 794 P.2d 460: 
As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh, supra: 
Once the threat that the suspect will 
injure the officers with concealed weapons 
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is 
no persuasive reason why the officers 
cannot take the time to secure a warrant. 
Such a requirement would present little 
impediment to police investigations, 
especially in light of the ease in 
which warrants can be obtained under Utah's 
telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953, 
7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.) 
gtate v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 272; see State v. Lopez, 
676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984). 
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CONCLUSION 
The defendant/appellant argues that the officer did not have 
the right to intrude his body into her vehicle and look around 
while the encounter was still a level-two stop to give a speeding 
ticket, and even if he had such a right nothing in the record or by 
common sense indicates that the spoon is indicative of any unlawful 
activity or was unlawful in itself and even if it were reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity, nothing in the record indicates 
that the officer could not have obtained a warrant and for those 
reasons the trial court erred and the Motion to Suppress should 
have been granted. 
. let DATED thrs / -> day of February, 1999 
Respectfully submitted, 
John/R/ Bttcher 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was delivered to the following on the YVx day of February, 1999. 
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